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DSA ODS: Is Certification Enough to Deliver Effective Redress?

DSA ODS: Is Certification Enough to Deliver Effective Redress?

3 days ago
10 min read

Updated: 2 days ago

by Pierfrancesco C. Fasano and Stefano Monguzzi


MFSD’s position on accessibility, independence and the sustainability of the Article 21 mechanism


Out-of-court Dispute Settlement (ODS) under the Digital Services Act offers an important avenue for protecting recipients of online platform services. Its credibility depends on translating certification requirements into safeguards that operate consistently in practice.


The Study prepared for the European Commission and completed in July 2026 identifies implementation challenges concerning admissibility, information exchange, fee structures, accessibility and the follow-up of ODS outcomes. These findings inform MFSD’s position: to await a clearer operational framework within which it can provide a professional dispute settlement service that meets the requirements of the DSA on a sustainable basis.


MFSD supports the objectives of Article 21. Its concern is how accessibility, independent assessment, professional expertise and financial viability can be secured together. Addressing this question requires contributions from providers, platforms and public authorities, with a clear distinction between matters that operators can resolve through cooperation and those requiring institutional clarification.

1. The starting point: the certification refusal and the sustainability of adjudicative ODS

By Decision No 500/24/CONS, adopted on 18 December 2024 and published on 7 March 2025, AGCOM rejected MFSD’s application for certification. The decision recognised MFSD’s experience and assessed favourably several aspects of its independence, expertise and procedural safeguards.


The concluding grounds concerned the proposed fee model.


MFSD acknowledges these findings. They nevertheless raise a broader question about the financial and professional sustainability of the service envisaged by Article 21.


The requirement that recipients should have access free of charge or for a nominal fee derives from the DSA itself and is applied by Digital Services Coordinators. It must be distinguished from the separate requirement that platform fees should be reasonable and should not exceed the costs incurred by the ODS body. Nominal user charges do not, in themselves, require nominal remuneration for the work undertaken.


MFSD’s concern is that this legislative approach becomes unsustainable where the requirement for free or nominal-cost access is not accompanied by a sufficiently clear and reliable mechanism for funding the professional work required. Charges to recipients may be negligible in relation to the significance of the dispute, which can extend well beyond its financial value to freedom of expression, reputation, intellectual property, access to an audience or the continuity of a professional activity. That disparity does not justify restricting access; it makes the question of how independent review is funded unavoidable.


The nature of the service is central to this assessment. The ODS DSA model proposed is adjudicative ADR: an independent and impartial third party examines the parties’ submissions, the available evidence and the applicable rules, and issues a reasoned, albeit non-binding, decision. It is not a mediation or conciliation procedure in which a neutral primarily facilitates dialogue and assists the parties in reaching their own agreement.


This distinction does not diminish the professional demands of facilitative ADR. It identifies the specific responsibilities and resources associated with independent determination: analysing the record, assessing competing arguments, applying legal and contractual standards, and explaining the outcome through a reasoned decision. The non-binding nature of that decision does not remove those responsibilities.


In MFSD’s assessment, a framework that leaves these activities inadequately funded risks undermining both the financial viability of the service and the quality of the review. Insufficient resources may constrain the time available for examining evidence, obtaining specialist expertise and preparing adequate reasons. Financial sustainability and procedural quality are therefore closely connected.


Clear and practical legislative guidance would provide the certainty needed for market operators such as MFSD to contribute effectively, recognising that these structural challenges require a coordinated institutional response. Accessible redress must rest on arrangements that enable independent providers to perform the substantive work the procedure requires. MFSD’s position is that these conditions should be sufficiently established before it commits to a renewed operational model.

2. An evolving institutional framework

The European Commission’s regulatory dialogue of 20 October 2026 addressed user information, eligibility for ODS review, information exchange, fees and the implementation of decisions. Digital Services Coordinators also presented their work on best practices within the European Board for Digital Services. (digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu⁠)


MFSD welcomes this institutional engagement. The issues identified require different responses. Some can be addressed through common templates, technical interoperability and improved communication. Others concern the interpretation of legal obligations, supervisory consistency or the allocation of structural costs.


MFSD’s position does not depend on complete harmonisation or the elimination of every practical difficulty. It seeks sufficient clarity to distinguish manageable operational risks from uncertainties that an individual provider cannot reasonably resolve alone.

3. Accessibility: free access must lead to usable redress

Article 21(5) requires dispute settlement to be available to recipients free of charge or for a nominal fee. This protection extends beyond consumers. (eur-lex.europa.eu⁠)


MFSD recognises that any future model must meet this requirement without transferring the financial risk of the procedure to users through incompatible advance payments.


Financial accessibility is nevertheless only one dimension of effective access. A procedure may be free yet difficult to use if recipients cannot identify the appropriate body, understand the eligibility requirements or provide the requested information. The study documents these obstacles.


MFSD therefore supports clear signposting, proportionate intake requirements and accessible explanations of procedural steps. The effectiveness of the mechanism should also be assessed by users’ practical ability to complete the process, particularly where they lack professional support.


Free access must be accompanied by a credible arrangement for financing the work required. The costs of administration, evidence handling and independent review remain, even where no payment is requested from the user.

4. Financial independence: protecting judgment and operational continuity

Independence, including financial independence, from platforms and recipients is an express certification requirement. Platform payment of ODS fees is nevertheless part of the statutory framework and does not, in itself, establish dependence.


The concern lies in operational practice. An ODS body may face pressure where a small number of organisations account for a substantial share of its income, or where disputed and delayed payments affect service continuity.


These are risks to be managed through appropriate safeguards. They do not establish that any particular body lacks independence.


MFSD supports transparent funding arrangements, effective conflict-of-interest controls and separation between financial administration and substantive decision-making. Payment procedures should also enable a body to continue handling cases without exposing decision-makers to commercial pressure.


Financial independence requires both freedom of judgment and an operational structure capable of sustaining that freedom.

5. Outcome-neutral remuneration: preserving professional assessment

The DSA requires the remuneration of an ODS body’s members to be unrelated to the outcome of the procedure.


MFSD considers that organisational safeguards should also address incentives associated with case volumes and processing times. Remuneration may be formally outcome-neutral while operating within arrangements that create pressure to close large numbers of cases rapidly.


Payment per case can be compatible with independent decision-making. It should be accompanied by realistic workload assumptions, appropriate assessment of complexity and sufficient time for substantive review.


Quality assurance should examine whether the relevant issues were considered and the outcome adequately explained. Productivity indicators should support, rather than displace, those assessments.

6. Proportionate fees: transparency requires an intelligible cost basis

Article 21(5) requires platform fees to be reasonable and not to exceed the costs incurred by the ODS body.


The study recommends greater fee transparency, comparability and contestability. It also supports models linked to the work performed, taking account of complexity, procedural stage and early resolution.


For MFSD, a central question is how these requirements should be applied consistently. How should administration, technology, security, training and professional remuneration be allocated? How should common operating costs be reflected in individual fees? How should the model treat cases that require initial work but do not proceed to a substantive decision?


Published tariffs make charges visible. An intelligible methodology makes their relationship to costs assessable.


MFSD supports common reference points that would also apply to any future proposal of its own. Standard fees may provide predictability, provided that they rest on a defensible methodology and are reviewed against operational evidence.

7. Financial sustainability: a shared implementation question

The study identifies tensions between affordable user access, the operational viability of ODS bodies and proportionate burdens on platforms. MFSD considers that these objectives should be addressed together.


An independent service must fund admissibility screening, case administration, substantive review and follow-up. It must also accommodate incomplete submissions, additional information requests and disputes over procedural scope.


The allocation of these costs should be sufficiently clear to support realistic planning. Otherwise, a provider may be required to undertake work without adequate certainty about the applicable charging arrangements or payment process.


MFSD supports predictable payment terms, transparent invoice-review procedures and prompt resolution of fee disputes. These measures would protect operational continuity while allowing platforms to raise substantiated objections.


Sustainability is also relevant to market participation. A workable framework should allow providers with different organisational and funding models to participate, provided that they meet the same requirements of independence, accessibility and quality.

8. Expertise and efficiency: the model must accommodate complexity

Content moderation disputes vary considerably. Some concern a readily identifiable error; others involve competing rights, contextual assessments, intellectual property, personal data or cross-border legal questions.


Standardisation can reduce the cost of repetitive tasks. It does not, by itself, ensure adequate assessment of every dispute.


MFSD considers that a credible model must identify cases requiring additional expertise or more extensive review and allocate appropriate resources. Cost-effectiveness should be assessed in relation to the work necessary to reach a reasoned outcome.


Any future MFSD proposal would need to demonstrate how professional expertise can be maintained while preserving free or nominal-cost access. Clearer operational expectations would assist providers in making that assessment responsibly.

9. Good faith cooperation: practical reference points are needed

Article 21(2) requires both parties to engage in good faith.


The study identifies uncertainty concerning disclosure, responses to information requests and post-decision engagement. Practical reference points would help translate this obligation into consistent conduct.


MFSD supports a minimum cooperation baseline covering identification of the contested measure, the grounds for moderation, relevant supporting information and substantiated explanations where disclosure is restricted.


Cooperation should remain reciprocal and proportionate. Users should explain their complaint and provide available material. Platforms should supply the information reasonably necessary for independent review and explain relevant objections.


Identifiable contact points, reliable communication channels and escalation arrangements would help address recurring difficulties. These operational measures should be supported by supervisory clarification where disagreement concerns the scope of legal obligations.

10. Procedural fairness and evidence: independent review requires an adequate record

The study identifies missing content, fragmented exchanges, inconsistent identifiers and retention gaps as obstacles to effective review. Much of the relevant information may also be held by the platform.


MFSD supports a minimum case-file baseline, secure information exchange and appropriate retention arrangements for ongoing disputes. Parties should have a meaningful opportunity to address material relied upon.


Data protection, confidentiality and restrictions on prohibited content must be respected. Where full disclosure is restricted, alternative evidentiary arrangements should be considered in accordance with applicable law.


The procedure should also explain how missing evidence affects the assessment. A reasoned decision must make clear the basis on which the body could examine the dispute and any material limitations encountered.

11. Procedural certainty: access should be predictable

The study records divergent approaches to expired decisions, temporary content, territorial connections, parallel proceedings and the relationship with internal complaint handling.


Procedural autonomy allows bodies to organise their work and develop specialist practices. Nevertheless, users should be able to understand the essential conditions of access before submitting a complaint.


MFSD supports convergence on core admissibility criteria and clearer user-facing information. Guidance should distinguish statutory requirements from conditions contained in individual procedural rules and explain how overlapping proceedings are handled.


Predictability would benefit all participants. It would reduce misdirected complaints, unnecessary procedural exchanges and disputes over matters that could be clarified in advance.

12. Effectiveness: non-binding outcomes require meaningful follow-up

The non-binding nature of ODS outcomes is an express feature of Article 21(2). It does not, in itself, prevent the mechanism from delivering effective redress.


Independent reasoning and a fair procedure can provide a credible basis for reconsidering a moderation decision. The practical value of the review nevertheless depends on the response.


The study recommends structured implementation feedback and explanations where a platform does not follow an ODS decision. MFSD supports this approach without treating every disagreement as evidence of bad faith.


Users should understand whether the decision has been implemented, whether redress is partial and what remains unresolved. Monitoring should distinguish favourable decisions from actual reinstatements or other corrective action. Case-closure figures alone cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of the remedy.

13. Supervision: compliance should be assessed throughout operation

The DSA provides for reporting and withdrawal of certification where the relevant conditions are no longer satisfied.


MFSD supports continuity between initial assessment and ongoing supervision. Independence, accessibility, professional capacity and justified costs should remain subject to proportionate scrutiny as caseloads and operating models develop.


Comparable evidence would help distinguish isolated difficulties from structural shortcomings and support the exchange of good practices.


This position does not imply preferential treatment of other applicants or non-compliance by particular bodies. It expresses an expectation that the same substantive principles should guide certification and the assessment of actual performance.

14. Institutional clarity and the contribution of market operators

The study proposes complementary avenues for improvement: stakeholder-led operational convergence, supervisory cooperation, targeted interpretative guidance and better monitoring.


MFSD supports this distribution of responsibilities. Operators can improve procedures, develop technical solutions and contribute practical experience. Platforms can strengthen information exchange and implementation feedback. Public authorities have an essential role in clarifying obligations and promoting consistent supervision.


Where difficulties arise from the design or interaction of statutory requirements, further legislative clarification may also be appropriate. This does not mean that every operational issue requires an amendment to the DSA. The response should match the nature of the problem.


Clear and practical legislative guidance would provide the certainty needed for market operators such as MFSD to contribute effectively, recognising that these structural challenges require a coordinated institutional response.


MFSD’s position is therefore to support the development of a workable framework while recognising the limits of what individual providers can achieve through their own procedural and financial arrangements.

MFSD’s position: awaiting conditions for a credible operational commitment

MFSD supports the objectives of Article 21 and recognises that any renewed application must address the findings concerning its previous model.


Its present decision to await further development reflects the need for a credible operational commitment: free or nominal-cost access, adequately resourced expertise, justified fees, effective cooperation and meaningful follow-up.


The study provides an evidence base for addressing these issues. It does not retrospectively validate MFSD’s previous proposal or establish general non-compliance across the sector.


MFSD does not expect an entirely uniform system or a framework without operational risk. It seeks sufficient legal and practical certainty to assess whether it can deliver the required safeguards consistently and sustainably.


The maturity of Article 21 will be measured by the redress users obtain, the independence and quality of the review, and the ability of ODS bodies to sustain that service over time. MFSD supports the institutional and operational developments needed to make those objectives achievable together.


Sources: European Commission, Study to assess Out-of-Court Dispute Settlement bodies under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Final Report, July 2026, DOI 10.2759/2316904; AGCOM Decision No 500/24/CONS; Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Article 21; European Commission, regulatory dialogue on ODS, 20 October 2026.


The institutional positions and proposals expressed in this article are those of MFSD; they are distinct from the study’s findings.

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